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I. INTRODUCTION 
Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination are indelible facets of 
modern law enforcement in this country, with federal, state, and local 
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officials pooling resources, sharing information, lending manpower, and 
coordinating prosecutorial strategy.1 Contentious issues of jurisdiction and 
investigatory control often give way to the common objectives of pursuing 
and successfully prosecuting suspected criminals.2 However, when these 
common objectives compel state legislatures and Congress to criminalize 
the same conduct, the possibility arises for multiple or successive 
prosecutions of a defendant for the same criminal act.3  
What, if any, protection does the Constitution afford suspected 
criminals in our system of concurrent jurisdiction? Longstanding 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause4 allows 
successive prosecutions by separate governments for the same conduct, 
prohibiting only successive prosecutions by the same government.5 This 
 1. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Reporters’ Draft for the Working Group on 
Federal-State Cooperation, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1319, 1322 (1995) (discussing, among other 
mechanisms of cooperation, the Justice Department’s Law Enforcement Coordination Committee 
program, which requires every U.S. Attorney’s office to establish a committee consisting of state, 
local, and federal law enforcement officials within the office’s territorial jurisdiction for purposes of 
communication, resource sharing, and cooperation).  
 Calls for increased intergovernmental cooperation are on the rise as post-September 11th 
legislation begins to take effect. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. O’HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE 
AMERICAN HOMELAND: ONE YEAR ON (2002).  
 2. Litman, supra note 1, at 1324. A recent example is the investigation, and race to prosecute, 
the D.C. sniper suspects. Virginia, Maryland, and federal authorities wrangled over which jurisdiction 
would be the first to prosecute the defendants, with the likelihood of obtaining death sentences playing 
a central role in the debate. Carol Morello & Katherine Shaver, Prosecutor Initiates Sniper Case 
Charges: Gansler to Seek Death for Muhammad, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at A1. Virginia 
convinced federal prosecutors not to file charges until the debate was resolved, wishing to avoid a 
Virginia law that would have barred a Virginia prosecution had the federal government filed first. Id. 
Such laws are discussed infra note 202.  
 3. For a discussion of the constitutional underpinnings of concurrent state/federal criminal 
jurisdiction and the lack of federal preemption of state criminal law, see Adam H. Kurland, First 
Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 
82-94 (1996), and Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1541, 1553-54 (2002) (noting only one Supreme Court decision has ever held a state criminal law to 
be preempted by a federal criminal statute). 
 4. “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 Generally, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from: (1) a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and (3) multiple punishment for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 
(1980) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). The rationale behind the protection 
is: 
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts 
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, 
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969). 
 5. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-91 (1985) (upholding an Alabama murder 
conviction of a defendant that had already secured a plea agreement with Georgia prosecutors for the 
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interpretation, the dual sovereign doctrine, declares that laws enacted by 
separate sovereigns criminalizing the same conduct are necessarily 
separate offenses and therefore are not subject to a double-jeopardy bar 
when prosecuted successively.6 
The legitimacy of the dual sovereign doctrine was at one time a source 
of heated debate in the Court7 and remains almost uniformly criticized by 
commentators.8 Nevertheless, it has been entrenched in American law 
since the late 1950s.9 The overriding complaint is best summarized by 
Justice Black’s observation that from the defendant’s point of view, he or 
she is being tried twice for the same offense irrespective of who is doing 
the prosecuting.10 An alternative perspective, the one embraced by the 
Court, shifts the focus to the encroachment on sovereign power that would 
result if a government were barred from enforcing its own criminal laws 
because bound by the adjudication of another government.11 Any 
satisfactory resolution of the debate must reconcile the protection of a 
basic civil liberty with due respect for the independent powers of separate 
governments in our federal system.12 
same murder). 
 6. Id. at 89 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).  
 7. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (upholding a federal conviction that followed a 
state conviction) and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (upholding a state conviction after a 
federal acquittal) solidified the doctrine in American case law, though both were narrow majorities, 
with Justice Black writing strong dissents in both. 
 8. See Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine 
and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801 (1985); Akil Reed Amar & 
Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995); Daniel 
A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of 
Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1992); Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: 
Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (1995) 
(criticizing successive prosecutions in cases involving multi-jurisdictional drug task forces); Special 
Issue, The Rodney King Trials: Civil Rights and Double Jeopardy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509 (1994); 
Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 383, 388-90 (1986) (exploring the role of the Eighteenth Amendment in the dual 
sovereign debate); Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281 (1992); Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal 
Governments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538 (1967) [hereinafter Another 
Exercise].  
 9. See supra note 7; see generally ADAM HARRIS KURLAND, SUCCESSIVE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS: THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS at xxvi (2001) (noting that the dual sovereign doctrine is “unlikely to be altered by the 
Supreme Court in the foreseeable future” despite repeated proposals for reform; surveying the current 
state of American law with regard to successive prosecutions). 
 10. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 11. See, e.g., Heath, 474 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 12. McCulloch v. Maryland defined sovereignty in our federal system: “In America, the powers 
of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the States. They are 
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the 
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Cautiously, this Note attempts to justify the status quo, exploring many 
of the criticisms of the doctrine13 while seeking possible explanations for 
its continuing vitality that go beyond textual plausibility and judicial 
inertia. Furthermore, this Note attempts to explain how the doctrine might, 
in its practical application, effectuate a satisfactory, if not necessary, 
balancing act, acknowledging criminal defendants’ interest in repose 
without upsetting the requisite etiquette of federalism.14 Giving context to 
the criticisms, and making their rebuttal challenging, this Note considers 
the peculiar case of a defendant acquitted of state murder charges who is 
then reprosecuted on federal murder charges predicated upon, by specific 
reference, violation of the very same state crime of which he was already 
acquitted.15 
II. THE PROSECUTIONS OF ROBERT ANGLETON16 
Robert Angleton was acquitted of capital murder in state court in 
Houston, Texas in 1998.17 Texas alleged that he hired his brother Roger to 
kill his wife Doris.18 Roger was also charged with murder in a separate 
indictment, but killed himself before either trial, leaving behind a suicide 
note saying he acted alone.19 Robert was then acquitted by a state jury.20  
objects committed to the other.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819), cited in Heath, 474 U.S. at 92.  
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88. 
 14. This Note seeks contemporary relevance of the dual sovereign doctrine’s federalism 
rationale.  
 15. United States v. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d 696 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (denying motion to dismiss, 
but granting leave for interlocutory appeal), aff’d 314 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 
1649 (2003). 
 16. In July of 2002, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Lee H. 
Rosenthal, J., denied Angleton’s motion to dismiss federal murder charges that followed state acquittal 
for the same murder, citing extensive dual sovereign precedent. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 698. 
Nevertheless, Judge Rosenthal’s opinion (over 100 pages in its original format) offered extensive 
discussion of Angleton’s challenge, finding it nonfrivolous so as to entitle Angleton to an expedited 
interlocutory appeal. Id. In December of 2002, the Fifth Circuit rejected Angleton’s challenges, relying 
heavily on Heath, 474 U.S. 82, and remanded the case for trial. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 
2002). In March of 2003, the Supreme Court refused to hear Angleton’s challenge to the dual 
sovereign doctrine. Angleton v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1649 (2003). After the unsuccessful appeal, 
Angelton’s federal trial was set to begin in June of 2003. However, Angleton fled to Amsterdam the 
day before his trial and was arrested there with a fake passport. Mike Tolson, Biding Time in Dutch 
Jail, Angleton pins hopes on double-jeopardy rule, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2003. As of the date of 
this Note’s publication, Angleton is in Dutch custody and is fighting extradition in Dutch courts on the 
grounds that our dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy is a violation of international law. Id. 
 17. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 700.  
 18. Id. at 699.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 700. Doris Angleton was seeking a divorce prior to her murder. Id. at 699. Robert 
Angleton was a Houston bookmaker who, ironically, often cooperated with both state and federal law 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/3
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] ACCEPTING THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION 769 
 
 
 
 
 
Some time after the acquittal, state prosecutors contacted the United 
States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Texas, which was 
investigating Angleton for federal RICO and money laundering 
violations.21 State prosecutors asked that the federal investigation be 
expanded to prosecute Angleton for the killing of his wife under federal 
law.22 State and federal law enforcement agents formed an unofficial joint 
task force to look into the matter.23 The task force included the Houston 
police officers who originally investigated Doris Angleton’s murder.24 
These officers were deputized as United States Deputy Marshals so as to 
be permitted access to FBI files relating to the federal investigation.25 Two 
state prosecutors who participated in the state acquittal were personal 
friends of the FBI agent conducting the federal investigation and 
cooperated with the joint task force.26 The task force acquired all 
information utilized in the state prosecution.27 In the course of the federal 
investigation, the FBI interviewed members of the jury that acquitted 
Angleton, questioning them as to what evidence and aspects of Texas’s 
case led them to return the not-guilty verdict.28  
In January 2002, U.S. Attorneys indicted Angleton on federal murder-
for-hire charges.29 The murder-for-hire statute makes it a crime to: (1) 
travel or use facilities in interstate commerce; (2) “with intent that a 
enforcement as an informant. Id. State prosecutors argued that the millions Robert earned as a bookie 
were at stake in the divorce and offered an audiotape taken from Roger’s possessions, which allegedly 
recorded a conversation between Roger and Robert, discussing the details of the murder and how to 
get past the security in the house where Doris was killed. Steve Brewer et al., Jury Hands an Acquittal 
to Angleton/Wealthy Ex-Bookie Cleared of Role in Wife’s ‘97 slaying, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 13, 1998, 
at A. To the surprise of the prosecution, its own expert witness submitted a report saying he could not 
conclude that it was Robert’s voice on the tape. Id. Angleton’s acquittal sparked national attention, and 
was the focus of an episode of 48 Hours (CBS television broadcast, June 10, 2002).  
 21. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d 696, 700.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. The officers remained on the payroll of the Houston Police Department throughout the 
federal investigation. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. The only witness to give testimony in front of the federal grand jury, the FBI agent who 
led the joint task force, is married to the Harris County District Attorney who oversaw the state 
prosecution. Id. at 717. 
 27. Id. The joint task force has worked to enhance the tape recording discredited in the state trial. 
Id. at 700-01 n.7. Additionally, federal prosecutors obtained evidence of an interview of Roger 
conducted by journalist Vanessa Leggett, before his suicide. Id. Leggett’s refusal to turn over her notes 
of the interview to the federal grand jury led to her five month jailing and became a high profile First 
Amendment case, ending with the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari to decide her journalist 
privilege claim. Leggett v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 1593 (2002).  
 28. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 700.  
 29. Id. at 701. Although the federal investigation originally focused on RICO and money 
laundering, these charges where not pursued. Id.  
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murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United 
States”; (3) for money or other compensation.30 With regard to the second 
element, the indictment alleged the murder of Doris Angleton was 
committed “in violation of the laws of the State of Texas and the United 
States.”31 The federal crime, like the state crime, can carry the death 
penalty.32 
Under current law, the state acquittal does not bar a federal prosecution 
for the same murder.33 Angleton’s case provides an interesting backdrop to 
explore the criticisms and justifications of the dual sovereign doctrine.34  
III. HISTORY AND CRITICISM 
A. Nineteenth Century Dual Sovereign Debate 
The dual sovereign debate first surfaced as dicta in Supreme Court 
cases of the early nineteenth century. In 1820, Houston v. Moore 
considered the constitutionality of a state statute purporting to grant state 
military courts authority to impose federal sanctions on militiamen who 
failed to report for federal duty.35 The defendant argued that the state 
statute was invalid because it created the possibility that a delinquent 
militiaman, if subjected to both state and federal court martials, would be 
twice punished for the same proscribed offense.36 To this, Justice 
Washington suggested that if jurisdiction were proper in both state and 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 31. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 701. The indictment further alleges that an agreement existed 
between the Angleton brothers to the effect that should Roger be caught, he would exonerate Robert. 
Id. In the federal trial, federal prosecutors will have to prove the elements of the Texas murder statute 
under which Angleton was acquitted in the state trial, in addition to the federal jurisdictional element 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1958.    
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000). Michael Ramsey, Angleton’s attorney, is quick to point out the 
harshness of the dual sovereign doctrine as applied in capital cases such as his client’s, “It is unfair that 
state verdicts are good enough to execute people but not good enough to exonerate.” Appeals Court 
Rules Man not in Double Jeopardy in Murder-For-Hire Case, Associated Press Newswires, Dec. 12, 
2002, available at WESTLAW, APWIRESPLUS.  
 33. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 1649 (2003); See also United 
States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing a federal murder-for-hire prosecution that 
followed a state acquittal for the same murder), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 873 (1997). 
 34. For Angleton’s challenges, see infra Part III.F. 
 35. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). The defendant in Houston was a militiaman who had failed to 
report for national service as ordered by presidential decree. Id. at 3. Congress had criminalized such 
delinquency by statute. Id. at 13-14. The Pennsylvania statute incorporated the federal penalties, by 
reference, and purported to authorize its military courts to enforce the federal law. Id. at 2. 
 36. Id. at 31. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/3
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] ACCEPTING THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION 771 
 
 
 
 
 
federal military courts, then final adjudication in one would bar 
prosecution in the other, and thus the state law was constitutional.37 
In 1847, the defendant in Fox v. Ohio argued an Ohio anti-
counterfeiting law was invalid because concurrent congressional 
criminalization might result in duplicative prosecutions for the same act of 
counterfeiting in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy 
prohibition.38 Entertaining the defendant’s hypothetical, the Court 
condoned the possibility of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, and dismissed 
the double jeopardy argument, noting that the Bill of Rights did not restrict 
the power of state governments.39 However, the Court went on to suggest 
that discretionary administration of law enforcement in areas of concurrent 
state and federal jurisdiction would remedy problems of duplicative 
prosecutions.40 Dissenting, Justice McLean saw concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction without double jeopardy protection as “a great defect in our 
 37. Id. at 32. The Court’s exact holding, and its role in the dual sovereign debate, is far from 
clear. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 725 n.26 (quoting Braun, supra note 8, at 9). Relevant in Justice 
Washington’s conclusion that a state court martial would bar a federal court martial was the fact that 
the federal law in question did not grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts (as was usually the 
case in federal criminal legislation), thus allowing room for binding state enforcement of the federal 
law in state courts, irrespective of the state statute incorporating the federal penalties. Houston, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) at 29. In a separate opinion, Justice Johnson asked, “Why may not the same offence be 
made punishable both under the laws of the States, and of the United States? Every citizen of a State 
owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and participates in the government of both the State 
and the United States.” Id. at 33 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson suggested that a 
government might consent to being bound to another’s adjudication noting, “[C]rimes against a 
government are only cognizable in its own Courts, or in those which derive their right of holding 
jurisdiction from the offended government.” Id. at 35. Whatever historical relevance the Houston 
debate might have, Bartkus interpreted Houston as only barring a successive prosecution when, “the 
second trial is for a violation of the very statute whose violation by the same conduct has already been 
tried in the courts of another government empowered to try that question.” 359 U.S. at 130 (emphasis 
added). 
 38. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434 (1847).  
 39. Id. at 434-435 (relying on its holding in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 
(1833)).  
 40. Id. at 435. In a famous passage: 
It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State and 
federal systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties 
denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to punishment by the other for 
acts essentially the same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or 
where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor. But were a contrary course of policy 
and action either probable or usual, this would by no means justify the conclusion, that 
offences falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish them 
would not properly be subjected to the consequences which those authorities might ordain 
and affix to their perpetration. 
Id. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
772 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:765 
 
 
 
 
 
system,” and concluded that the Supremacy Clause mandated invalidation 
of the state law.41 
Five years later in Moore v. Illinois, a defendant argued that the 
coexistence of an Illinois fugitive slave law and a similar federal law could 
result in duplicative punishment.42 Again, the Court found concurrent 
jurisdiction and the possibility of duplicative punishment unobjectionable, 
broadly reasoning that citizens in a federalist system are obligated to 
conform their conduct to both state and federal law, a breach of one 
government’s laws being a distinct offense from a breach of the other’s 
law.43 Justice McLean again argued that the federal law should preempt 
the state’s.44  
 41. Id. at 439-40 (McLean, J., dissenting). In Justice McLean’s view, there were only two 
permissible solutions to the defendant’s hypothetical: either criminal jurisdiction must be mutually 
exclusive as between the states and the federal government, or if concurrent jurisdiction exists, then 
double jeopardy protection must extend to successive prosecutions by state and federal governments. 
Id. at 439. Although “common principles of humanity” and the “spirit” of double jeopardy protection 
compel its application across concurrent jurisdictions, this latter alternative was clearly foreclosed by 
Barron, as well as by considerations of sovereignty in a federal system: “There can be no greater 
mistake than to suppose that the federal government, in carrying out any of its supreme functions, is 
made dependent on the State governments.” Id. Therefore, Justice McLean called for exclusive federal 
jurisdiction in the area of counterfeiting and an invalidation of the state law under the Supremacy 
Clause. Id. at 440.  
 42. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 17 (1852).  
 43. Id. at 20. In a passage later relied upon in Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121, and Abbate, 359 U.S. 187:  
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to 
owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the 
laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an 
assault upon the marshal of the United States, and hindering him in the execution of legal 
process, is a high offence against the United States, for which the perpetrator is liable to 
punishment; and the same act may be also a gross breach of the peace of the State, a riot, 
assault, or a murder, and subject the same person to a punishment, under the State laws, for a 
misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, 
cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished 
for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of 
which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a 
conviction by the other . . . . 
Id.  
 44. Id. at 22 (McLean, J., dissenting). Furthermore Justice McLean recognized the common 
interests for which Congress and states legislate: 
It is true, the criminal laws of the Federal and State Governments emanate from different 
sovereignties; but they operate upon the same people, and should have the same end in view. 
In this respect, the Federal Government, though sovereign within the limitation of its powers, 
may, in some sense, be considered as the agent of the States, to provide for the general 
welfare, by punishing offences under its own laws within its jurisdiction. It is believed that no 
government, regulated by laws, punishes twice criminally the same act. And I deeply regret 
that our government should be an exception to a great principle of action, sanctioned by 
humanity and justice. 
Id. (emphasis added). Focusing on the perspective of the individual defendant, Justice McLean saw 
successive prosecutions as “contrary to the nature and genius of our government,” which divided 
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B. Modern Doctrine  
United States v. Lanza is the Supreme Court’s first application of the 
dual sovereign doctrine, allowing federal enforcement of national 
prohibition laws under the Eighteenth Amendment against defendants 
already punished under state law for the same acts.45 The Court held that 
“[A]n act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is 
an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by 
each.”46 The Court again noted that the Fifth Amendment was not a 
limitation on the states.47 Furthermore, binding the federal government to 
state adjudication in a state with lesser fines or punishments would result 
in a “race of offenders” to state courts in order to admit guilt and secure 
immunity from the harsher federal law, and would thus undermine the 
efficacy of the national prohibition.48 
The Court solidified the doctrine in Bartkus v. Illinois49 and Abbate v. 
United States,50 both decided on the same day in 1959. Bartkus upheld a 
state conviction for bank robbery that followed a federal acquittal on 
essentially identical charges (robbery of a federally insured bank.)51 
Conversely, Abbate upheld a federal conviction that followed a state 
conviction.52  
governmental power so as to preserve personal liberty. Id. at 21.  
 45. 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Although Lanza was the Court’s first application of the doctrine, 
Justice Taft stated that it was “supported by a long line of decisions.” Id. at 382, 384 (citing Fox and 
Moore). 
 46. Id. at 382. The Court invoked the dual sovereign rationale:  
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing 
with the same subject-matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by the 
other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity 
to acts prohibited by the Amendment. Each government in determining what shall be an 
offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. 
Id. The Court gave the formal/textual basis for the doctrine: “The defendants thus committed two 
different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against 
that State is not a conviction of the different offense against the United States, and so is not double 
jeopardy.” Id. 
 47. Id. Justice Taft addressed the problem of successive prosecutions to Congress, stating “If 
Congress sees fit to bar prosecution by the federal courts for any act when punishment for violation of 
state prohibition has been imposed, it can, of course, do so by proper legislative provision . . . .” Id. at 
385. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
 50. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).  
 51. 359 U.S. at 122.  
 52. 359 U.S. at 187. Both convictions concerned a union conspiracy to destroy facilities of a 
telephone company during a labor strike. Id. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
774 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:765 
 
 
 
 
 
Bartkus relied on Lanza, the nineteenth century dicta, and a selection of 
state cases.53 Again, the Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not incorporate the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy bar to apply to the 
states, but then went on to discuss the effects of abandoning the doctrine.54 
The Court noted that state and federal offenses criminalizing the same 
conduct often carry drastically different penalties, and that to bar a 
government from enforcing its laws because of adjudication by another 
would be an affront to the division of powers in our federal system.55 
Furthermore such a bar would be, as a practical matter, difficult for courts 
to apply.56 Ultimately, the Court deferred to the states and Congress to 
solve the problem of successive prosecutions through explicit legislation, 
rather than to construct a judicial solution via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.57 Abbate repeated many of the same concerns.58 
The Bartkus Court suggested an exception to the dual sovereign 
doctrine—a state prosecution following a federal acquittal would be barred 
with a showing that the federal government orchestrated and used the state 
prosecution to bypass the double jeopardy prohibition.59 A group of 
 53. 359 U.S. at 129-37. Consequently:  
With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state and federal courts have for years 
refused to bar a second trial even though there had been a prior trial by another government 
for a similar offense, it would be disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of 
impressive adjudication for the Court now to rule that due process compels such a bar.  
Id. at 136.  
 54. Id. at 129.   
 55. Id. at 137. Concerned with the preservation of state power: “It would be in derogation of our 
federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of prosecution of 
minor federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the States.” Id. Justice Frankfurter 
then abdicated the Court’s role in refereeing successive prosecutions, acquiescing to what he perceived 
to be the prudential demands of the Constitution’s vertical as well as horizontal divisions of power: 
[S]eparation of powers was adopted in the Constitution “not to promote efficiency but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” Time has not lessened the concern of the Founders 
in devising a federal system which would likewise be a safeguard against arbitrary 
government. The greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results 
with which a court is in little sympathy. 
Id. at 137-38. 
 56. Id. at 138. The difficult inquiry would be into the degree of similarity between the state and 
federal offense needed to trigger a bar. Id.  
 57. Id. Several states had already enacted statutes to bar or limit their governments’ ability to 
initiate second prosecutions. Id. Congress could tailor federal legislation on the matter to specific 
offenses, or across the criminal code. Id. at 138-39. 
 58. 359 U.S. at 195. The Court recognized that disparity of sentences between state and federal 
offenses is inevitable because some acts “impinge more seriously on a federal interest than on a state 
interest.” Id. Consequently, if “state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts, 
federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered.” Id.  
 59. 359 U.S. 121, 123-24. The Majority refused to apply such an exception, holding that the 
degree of intergovernmental cooperation in the facts of Bartkus’s second prosecution  
[did] not support the claim that the State of Illinois in bringing its prosecution was merely a 
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dissenters argued that the facts of Bartkus warranted application of this 
“sham prosecution” exception.60 
Justice Black wrote strong dissents in both cases, unwilling to accept 
the Court’s invocation of federalism.61 He doubted that lifting the doctrine 
would impair either state or federal law enforcement.62 Furthermore, he 
rejected the notion that two governments might do in tandem what neither 
could do alone.63 Justice Black repeatedly asserted that from the 
perspective of the accused, multiple prosecutions violate a fundamental 
protection embodied in the Constitution and common law.64 
tool of the federal authorities, who thereby avoided the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment 
against a retrial of a federal prosecution after an acquittal. It does not sustain a conclusion that 
the state prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in 
essential fact another federal prosecution. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Bartkus, federal authorities, displeased with a federal 
jury acquittal, solicited state prosecutors to press charges. Id. at 165. After the federal acquittal, federal 
officers collected evidence and ensured witness availability for the state trial. Id. The state conceded 
during oral arguments that the federal officers instigated, guided, and prepared the state case. Id. The 
dissenters felt the Court’s role was to determine how much federal participation can be allowed before 
a double jeopardy bar should apply. Id. at 167-68. The dissenters doubted, given the circumstances 
surrounding Bartkus’s second prosecution, that judicial invalidation would “do violence to the 
principles of federalism.” Id. at 168. Nonetheless, the dissenters were wary of disruption of 
intergovernmental cooperation in law enforcement, recognizing that such cooperation is to be “desired 
and encouraged.” Id. at 168-69. However, the dissenters suggested that “normal and healthy” 
cooperation is best exemplified by joint investigation and prosecution in a single trial. Id. at 169. 
 61. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 150; Abbate, 359 U.S. at 201. Justice Black attacked the federalism 
rationale:  
The Court, without denying the almost universal abhorrence of such double prosecutions, 
nevertheless justifies the practice here in the name of “federalism.” This, it seems to me, is a 
misuse and desecration of the concept. . . . We should . . . be suspicious of any supposed 
“requirements” of “federalism” which result in obliterating ancient safeguards. I have been 
shown nothing in the history of our Union, in the writings of its Founders, or elsewhere, to 
indicate that individual rights deemed essential by both State and Nation were to be lost 
through the combined operations of the two governments.  
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155-56.  
 62. Id. at 156-57. Justice Black took issue with the majority’s premise that an intergovernmental 
double jeopardy bar would impair law enforcement, arguing such logic “relies on the unwarranted 
assumption that State and Nation will seek to subvert each other’s laws.” Id. at 156. 
 63. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 203. Reminiscent of Justice McLean’s dissents in Moore and Fox, Justice 
Black argued that Congress could avoid frustration of federal interests by preempting coexisting state 
criminal law. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 157. 
 64. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155. Justice Black prophesized abuse of the dual sovereign doctrine: 
Inevitably, the victims of such double prosecutions will most often be the poor and the weak 
in our society, individuals without friends in high places who can influence prosecutors not to 
try them again. The power to try a second time will be used . . . to make scapegoats of 
helpless, political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differ, who do not conform 
and who resist tyranny.  
Id. at 163. 
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C. The Doctrine’s Survival of Incorporation 
The twentieth century saw the piecemeal incorporation of much of the 
Bill of Rights, via the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
to apply to exercises of state power, in effect, departing from the line of 
precedent of Barron v. Baltimore.65 Among the limitations made 
applicable to the states were the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
self-incrimination66 and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.67  
Post-incorporation, the Court abandoned facsimiles of the dual 
sovereign doctrine in the context of intergovernmental cooperation 
transgressing the above two protections.68 No longer could evidence 
unlawfully seized by federal authorities be used in state trials and vice 
versa.69 No longer could federal authorities compel testimony that would 
incriminate a witness under state law and vice versa.70 
In 1969, Benton v. Maryland incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause 
to apply to states.71 Though inapplicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
to the States was a consideration in dual sovereign precedent, the doctrine 
 65. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights was not a limitation on the power 
of the states). For a discussion of Justice Frankfurter’s role in the incorporation debate, see Richard L. 
Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1197 (1995). For a discussion of the substantive effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Bill of 
Rights, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).  
 66. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the Self-Incrimination Clause to apply to 
the states). 
 67. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 68. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (abandoning the “silver platter doctrine”); 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (abandoning a dual sovereign exception in the 
context of the Self-Incrimination Clause). 
 69. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208. The Court focused on the rights of the individual criminal defendant: 
“To the victim [of an unlawful seizure] it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded 
by a federal agent or by a state officer.” Id. at 215. Summarizing its rationale, the Court stated, “[N]o 
distinction can logically be drawn between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
and that obtained in violation of the Fourteenth. The Constitution is flouted equally in either case.” Id.  
 70. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77. The Court stated that incorporation of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
to apply to the states in Malloy, decided on the same day, gave reason to reconsider the rule that 
allowed prosecutors to compel testimony incriminating the witness under another sovereign’s laws. Id. 
at 76. The Court looked to the policy behind the clause, protection of individuals from compelled self-
incrimination, and concluded that a dual sovereignty exception would contravene that policy. Id. at 55. 
Furthermore, the Court was wary of the potential for abrogation of the privilege if the separate 
sovereign exception were allowed “in our age of ‘cooperative federalism,’ where the Federal and State 
Governments are waging a united front against many types of criminal activity.” Id. at 55-56. 
 71. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Benton cited a portion of Justice Black’s dissent in Bartkus, which 
detailed the origin of double jeopardy protection as a fundamental principle of justice and a universal 
maxim of common law. Id. at 795 (citing Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 151-56). 
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has not been abandoned post-incorporation in the double jeopardy 
context.72  
In a 1985 case, Heath v. Alabama, the Court refused to abandon the 
doctrine, despite the particularly harsh results of its application.73 Heath 
hired men to kill his wife, who was subsequently kidnapped from her 
home in Alabama and killed, with her body dumped in Georgia.74 Heath 
pled guilty to malice murder under Georgia law in exchange for a life 
sentence.75 Shortly thereafter, Alabama prosecuted and convicted Heath 
for the same murder and sentenced him to death.76 The Supreme Court 
held that the Alabama prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy as 
Georgia and Alabama were separate sovereigns, each deriving its power 
from an independent source. Therefore the murder constituted two 
separate offenses under the dual sovereign doctrine.77 The Court refused to 
address whether jurisdiction was improper in Alabama because the 
 72. Justice Douglas, sitting as a circuit justice, suggested that Benton might “cast doubt upon the 
continuing vitality of Bartkus” and the dual sovereign doctrine. Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303, 
1307 (1975). However, three years later, without discussion of Benton, United States v. Wheeler 
applied Bartkus and the doctrine to allow federal prosecution of a Navajo tribe member accused of 
statutory rape who had already been prosecuted under Navajo tribal law, deeming the tribe to be a 
separate sovereign. 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978). Justice Brennan did not participate in Wheeler and 
Justice Douglas left the Court shortly after Smith; thus none of the original Bartkus dissenters 
participated in Wheeler. 
 73. 474 U.S. 82 (1985). 
 74. Heath, 474 U.S. at 84. Forensic evidence suggested that the actual killing took place in 
Georgia. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 85-86. Prior to Heath’s Georgia confession, Alabama and Georgia officials had 
cooperated in investigating the murder. Id.  
 77. Id. at 88. The Court relied, almost entirely, on the textual basis of the doctrine and applied it 
to successive prosecutions between states: 
“[A]n offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law.” Consequently, 
when the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, “it cannot be truly averred that the 
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has 
committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable.”  
Id. at 88 (citing Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19-20). Completing its analysis, the Court noted: 
The States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect to the 
Federal Government. Their powers to undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate 
and independent sources of power and authority originally belonging to them before 
admission to the Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.  
Id. at 89. The Court rejected Heath’s request to limit the dual sovereign doctrine to cases in which 
“allowing only one entity to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant will interfere with the 
unvindicated interests of the second entity and that multiple prosecutions therefore are necessary for 
the satisfaction of the legitimate interests of both entities.” Id. at 92. The Court soundly rejected this 
balancing approach as uncertain and difficult, as well as irreconcilable with the dual sovereignty 
principle: “A State’s interest in vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by 
definition can never be satisfied by another State’s enforcement of its own laws.” Id. at 93. The 
majority made no mention of Benton.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
778 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:765 
 
 
 
 
 
defendant did not raise the issue on appeal in Alabama courts.78 
Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued that the true rationale behind the dual 
sovereign doctrine did not warrant its application to successive state 
prosecutions.79 
 78. Id. at 87. Alabama had a statute giving the state criminal jurisdiction over any crime that was 
commenced in Alabama, regardless of where it consummated. Id. at 85. Heath’s counsel objected to 
jurisdiction at trial, but did not raise the issue on state appeal. Id. The Supreme Court refused to hear 
this issue, further noting that Heath made no due process objections (perhaps referring either to an 
ineffective counsel argument or Justice Marshall’s dissent). Id. at 86. Heath’s subsequent attempts to 
have his Alabama conviction set aside because of ineffective counsel and lack of jurisdiction failed 
and he was executed in 1992. Ex parte Heath, 601 So. 2d 217 (Ala. 1992) (setting date of execution). 
 79. 474 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall did not contest the validity of the 
dual sovereign doctrine in the context of successive state and federal prosecutions, but saw its 
justification as more than a narrow interpretation of the “offence” language that the majority offered in 
its holding: “This strained reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause has survived and indeed flourished 
in this Court’s cases not because of any inherent plausibility, but because it provides reassuring 
interpretivist support for a rule that accommodates the unique nature of our federal system.” Id. at 98. 
Justice Marshall then explained this accommodation, offering perhaps the most cogent analytical 
framing of the dual sovereign debate:  
Under the constitutional scheme, the Federal Government has been given the exclusive power 
to vindicate certain of our Nation’s sovereign interests, leaving the States to exercise 
complementary authority over matters of more local concern. The respective spheres of the 
Federal Government and the States may overlap at times, and even where they do not, 
different interests may be implicated by a single act. . . . Yet were a prosecution by a State, 
however zealously pursued, allowed to preclude further prosecution by the Federal 
Government for the same crime, an entire range of national interests could be frustrated. The 
importance of those federal interests has thus quite properly been permitted to trump a 
defendant’s interest in avoiding successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for the same 
crime . . . . Conversely, because “the States under our federal system have the principal 
responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes,” it would be inappropriate—in the absence 
of a specific congressional intent to pre-empt state action pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause—to allow a federal prosecution to preclude state authorities from vindicating “the 
historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their confines.” 
. . . The complementary nature of the sovereignty exercised by the Federal Government and 
the States places upon a defendant burdens commensurate with concomitant privileges. Past 
cases have recognized that the special ordeal suffered by a defendant prosecuted by both 
federal and state authorities is the price of living in a federal system, the cost of dual 
citizenship. Every citizen, the Court has noted, “owes allegiance to the two departments, so to 
speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties which each exacts for 
disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its own 
jurisdiction.” 
Id. at 99-100 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Marshall concluded that these justifications 
did not warrant extension of the doctrine to the successive state prosecutions. Id. at 101. Justice 
Marshall noted the abandonment of dual sovereign exceptions in Murphy and Elkins, but saw it 
distinguishable from the double jeopardy context: “It is one thing to bar a sovereign from using certain 
evidence and quite another to bar it from prosecuting altogether.” Id. at 102 n.3. However, he read 
those cases to suggest that “courts should not be blind to the impact of combined federal-state law 
enforcement on an accused’s constitutional rights,” and argued that due process guarantees of 
fundamental fairness demand constitutional invalidation of Heath’s Alabama conviction, given that 
Georgia law enforcement officials were leading prosecution witnesses in the Alabama trial. Id. at 102 
n.3, 103.  
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D. The Petite Policy 
In response to Bartkus, the Justice Department instituted what is known 
as the Petite Policy80 to deal with the issue of successive prosecutions.81 
Under the policy in its current form, federal prosecutors wishing to bring a 
federal prosecution following a state prosecution based on the same 
conduct must obtain approval from an Assistant Attorney General after 
showing that the prior prosecution has left a substantial federal interest 
demonstrably unvindicated.82 
E. Criticisms of the Doctrine and Questions Raised   
1. Is the Invocation of Federalism Sufficient to Justify the Doctrine, 
and are such Justifications Outdated? 
Critics of the dual sovereign doctrine have seen the Court’s invocation 
of federalism as misguided,83 overly formalistic,84 outdated given the 
expansion of federal criminal law and the rise of cooperative federalism,85 
 80. Named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (vacating a judgment at the request 
of the Justice Department made in accordance with its new policy).  
 81. The purpose of the policy is threefold: (1) to protect defendants from multiple punishment or 
prosecution for the same criminal act; (2) to ensure efficient use of department resources; and (3) to 
“promote coordination and cooperation between federal and state prosecutors.” 3 DOJ Manual tit. 9-
2.031(A) (2003), available at http://www.doj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm. 
htm#9-2.031. 
 82. Id. Under the policy, there is a presumption that the prior prosecution vindicated the federal 
interest, but this presumption can be overcome upon considerations such as: 
[F]irst, incompetence, corruption, intimidation, or undue influence; second, court or jury 
nullification in clear disregard of the evidence or the law; third, the unavailability of 
significant evidence, either because it was not timely discovered or known by the prosecution, 
or because it was kept from the trier of fact’s consideration because of an erroneous 
interpretation of the law; fourth, the failure in a prior state prosecution to prove an element of 
a state offense that is not an element of the contemplated federal offense; and fifth, the 
exclusion of charges in a prior federal prosecution out of concern for fairness to other 
defendants, or for significant resource considerations that favored separate federal 
prosecutions.  
Id. at (D) (detailing additional scenarios warranting a second prosecution). 
 For a detailed description of the workings of the Petite Policy, see KURLAND, supra note 9.  
 83. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155-56 (Black, J., dissenting); Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy 
All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609, 618 n.32 
(1994) (asserting that virtually all commentators have argued for abandonment or limitation of the dual 
sovereign doctrine).  
 84. See, e.g., Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 8, at 817-19 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
application of the dual sovereign doctrine rationale in Heath as a simplistic “rhetorical exercise” based 
entirely on an “unelaborated notion of sovereignty”).  
 85. See Braun, supra note 8, at 8-9 (“The proliferation of federal criminal legislation and the 
increasingly commonplace interaction between federal and state law enforcement efforts are closely 
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contrary to original intent,86 denigrating the constitutionally-mandated 
finality of jury verdicts,87 and insufficient to justify the abrogation of a 
fundamental right of criminal defendants, innocent or otherwise.88 In stark 
contrast, Justice Holmes once stated that the doctrine was a proposition 
“too plain to need more than statement.”89 What exactly are the federalism 
concerns that mandate a dual sovereign doctrine?  
2. Why has the Dual Sovereign Doctrine Survived Incorporation? 
Does Benton v. Maryland’s incorporation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause against the states emasculate the reasoning of Lanza, Bartkus, and 
Abbate?90 The Heath majority did not expressly address this argument.91 
Critics have asserted that the post-incorporation survival of the dual 
sovereign doctrine in the double jeopardy context is not reconcilable with 
the post-incorporation abandonment of the doctrine in the context of self-
incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures.92 What 
related parts of the same historical development. As the laws increase the incidence of successive 
prosecutions, the way in which the laws are enforced demonstrate a corresponding increase in the need 
to reexamine the rule and rationale that allow such prosecutions to occur.”).  
 86. See Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some 
Observations on Original Meaning and the ACLU’s Schizophrenic Views of the Dual Sovereign 
Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 693, 709-12 (1994) (suggesting that in drafting the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, the Framers intended to import the English practice at the time, which allowed a defense of 
autrefois acquit to bar a prosecution when a defendant had already been acquitted by a competent 
court of a foreign government); but see KURLAND, supra note 9, at 2 (“The doctrine is almost certainly 
consistent with the original intent of the framers.”). 
 In Bartkus, Justice Frankfurter dismissed the relevance of the English precedent: “Such precedents 
are dubious . . . because they reflect a power of discretion vested in English judges not relevant to the 
constitutional law of our federalism.” 359 U.S. at 128 n.9.  
 87. Dawson, supra note 8, at 282 (arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be understood 
“as a structural provision implementing the principle of popular sovereignty” which secures the power 
of jury nullification).  
 88. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 150 (Black, J., dissenting); Amar, supra note 8, at 16 (“the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s emphasis on individual rights against all government trumps abstract notions 
of federalism”); see generally Akil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1426 (1987) (critical of Supreme Court decisions neglecting that “the Constitution’s political structure 
of federalism and sovereignty is designed to protect, not defeat, its legal substance of individual 
rights”). 
 89. Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927), quoted in Heath, 474 U.S. at 89. In fact, 
the Heath majority has been criticized for giving the doctrine little more than statement. See also Allen 
& Ratnawamy, supra note 8, at 804 (asserting that Heath is a case that needs “to be studied to 
determine whether there is any justification for the Court’s conclusions, despite the Court’s failure to 
consider or articulate it”).  
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 47, 54. 
 91. Justice Marshall, in dissent, acknowledges Benton’s incorporation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause to apply to the states. Heath, 474 U.S. at 97.  
 92. Amar, supra note 8, at 11-16; Braun, supra note 8, at 42; Murchison, supra note 8, at 417-19.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/3
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] ACCEPTING THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION 781 
 
 
 
 
 
distinguishes the dual sovereign rationale in the double jeopardy context 
from the contexts of the protections no longer limited by the dual 
sovereign doctrine?93  
3. Why Not Reform the Doctrine or Limit its Application? 
Critics and criminal defendants have suggested a wide array of 
alternatives to the current rigid dual sovereign approach.94 Should the 
doctrine exist at all?95 Should the doctrine be abandoned except in civil 
rights cases,96 cases involving state actors,97 or cases in which the first jury 
verdict was otherwise “flawed” or “tainted”?98 Should successive 
prosecution be permissible only in cases where the prosecuting sovereign 
can demonstrate a substantial unvindicated interest?99 Should courts force 
state and federal officials to prosecute a defendant in a single proceeding 
or otherwise coordinate their prosecutorial interests?100 Should courts 
invoke a broader “sham prosecution” exception?101 Are there any related 
 93. Another Exercise, supra note 8, at 1544-49, posed this question in 1967, two years before 
Benton. 
 94. See generally NORMAN ABRAMS & SARAH SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 771-83 (2d ed. 1993) (surveying various unsuccessful attempts at reform made by 
criminal defendants and commentators). 
 95. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 150 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 96. Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights “Exception”, 41 UCLA 
L. REV. 649, 661 (1994) (arguing for an abandonment of the dual sovereign doctrine except in 
prosecutions for federal civil rights violations, noting that such prosecutions “play an essential role in 
the fulfillment of the federal government’s responsibility to guarantee the constitutional rights of all 
citizens,” and that “[t]his role could be frustrated if these prosecutions were barred where prior state 
court proceedings resulted in acquittals or insufficient sentences”). 
 97. Amar, supra note 8, at 16-20 (calling for abandonment of the doctrine except when the 
federal government reprosecutes “tyrannical” state officials, thereby exercising authority vested by the 
enforcement provision, section 5, of the Fourteenth Amendment; recognizing that an “alleged 
constitutional offence committed by state officials will always uniquely implicate the federal 
government’s authority”).  
 98. Id. at 54, 57 (arguing for additional exceptions for prosecutions following acquittals by 
racially stacked or tainted juries).  
 99. See, e.g., Another Exercise, supra note 8, at 1561 (proposing that “a satisfactory balance 
between considerations of federalism and the interests of the individual defendant” would be achieved 
with a “separate interest” test, whereby “If . . . the federal interest to be vindicated by prosecution were 
substantially different from the state interest involved in the initial trial, successive trials would be 
allowed”).  
 100. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 94, at 777 (discussing this approach); Taryn A. Merkl, 
Note, The Federalization of Criminal Law and Double Jeopardy, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175, 
203-07 (1999) (proposing joinder of state and federal claims in a single proceeding, as a partial 
solution to the dual sovereign debate). 
 101. See Braun, supra note 8, at 73 (suggesting that “The rule permitting successive prosecutions 
should be suspended when state and federal officials participating in the investigation or prosecution 
of criminal conduct have acted more like representatives of one government than of two”).  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p765 Owsley book pages.doc2/4/2004   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
782 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:765 
 
 
 
 
 
due process protections, such as collateral estoppel102 or remedies against 
“vindictive” prosecutions103 that should afford defendants protection that 
the doctrine otherwise denies? These questions demand a corollary 
inquiry—what implications might altering the doctrine have?  
F. Angleton’s Challenges  
Angleton urges that the rise of cooperative federalism and Benton’s 
incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause undermine the foundations of 
the dual sovereign doctrine.104 Alternatively, Angleton argues that in light 
of the expansion of federal criminal law since Bartkus and Abbate and the 
Supreme Court’s recent refinement of the scope of the Commerce 
Clause,105 the murder-for-hire statute should be interpreted so as to require 
federal prosecutors to demonstrate a substantial federal interest before 
being allowed to proceed with the second trial.106 Furthermore, Angleton 
argues that the dual sovereign doctrine is inapplicable in his case because: 
(1) the degree of intergovernmental cooperation evident in the federal 
prosecution triggers the Bartkus “sham prosecution” exception;107 (2) 
incorporation of the Texas law into the federal statute bars federal 
prosecution after a failed prosecution of the derivative state offense;108 and 
 102. Note, The Due Process Roots of Criminal Collateral Estoppel, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1729, 
1742-45 (1996) (arguing a due process basis for reinvigoration of criminal collateral estoppel, and for 
application of the principle in certain dual sovereign contexts). 
 103. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 94, at 718-23, 777. 
 104. Angleton, 314 F.3d at 771.  
 105. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think of no better 
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the 
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating, as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990). 
 106. Angleton, 314 F.3d at 775-76. The Fifth Circuit saw this argument as tantamount to adoption 
of judicial enforcement of the Petite Policy and summarily rejected it. Id. Courts have invariably held 
that the Petite Policy does not confer defendants any judicially enforceable rights. See, e.g., United 
States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 107. Angleton, 314 F.3d at 773. The Fifth Circuit relied on the facts of Bartkus to condone the 
degree of intergovernmental cooperation in Angleton’s federal prosecution. Id. at 774. 
 108. Id. at 774. Angleton elaborated this argument in his petition for certiorari, “Where one 
sovereign is enforcing the second sovereign’s laws by incorporating its criminal statute as the primary 
element of the indicted offense, it is not acting separately and the doctrine does not apply.” United 
States v. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 202), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Feb. 
19, 2003) (No. 02-1233). The Fifth Circuit rejected Angleton’s reliance on Houston for the proposition 
that “the attempt of the United States derivatively to enforce the state statute dictates the conclusion 
that the sovereigns do not have ‘independent and separate interests.’” 314 F.3d at 775 (citing Heath’s 
rejection of any balance-of-interests test). 
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(3) collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the elements of the Texas 
statute.109  
Angleton’s arguments, and those of defendants in similar situations, 
have failed thus far.110 Why should Angleton be subject to the second 
prosecution given the extent of intergovernmental cooperation and why 
should the specific incorporation of the Texas law in the federal statute not 
bind the federal government to the state adjudication?  
IV. ANALYSIS: SEEKING JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DUAL SOVEREIGN 
DOCTRINE 
A. A Closer Look at the Invocation of Federalism  
Concurrent criminal jurisdiction in our federal system has forced courts 
to resolve an array of complex legal issues.111 Justice McClean’s quick and 
easy solution was that federal criminal law should preempt that of the 
states;112 however, both Congress and the Court have been long unwilling 
to uproot an area of law traditionally reserved to the states.113 When a 
defendant’s alleged act transgresses both state and federal law, must one 
government forgo its ability to prosecute in favor of the other in order to 
protect the defendant’s right to repose? The dual sovereign doctrine says 
no. This, perhaps, is why: 
If a federal prosecution were to bar a state from enforcing that state’s 
own criminal laws, the effect would be tantamount to that of preemption—
an impermissible outcome.114 Likewise, if a state prosecution were to bar 
the federal government from enforcing its own criminal laws, the effect 
would be analogous to the long dead doctrines of interposition and 
 109. 314 F.3d at 776. The Fifth Circuit rejected Angleton’s collateral estoppel claim on two 
grounds. Id. First, collateral estoppel only applies to issues decided by a prior final judgment between 
the same parties and because Texas and the United States are not interchangeable in this regard, 
collateral estoppel is inapplicable. Id. Second, the principle of collateral estoppel is embodied in the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and because a successive prosecution is allowed under the dual sovereign 
doctrine, a lesser collateral estoppel bar is inapplicable. Id. (citing Ashe v. Swinson, 397 U.S. 436 
(1970)). 
 110. 314 F.3d at 776; see also United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing a 
federal murder-for-fire prosecution that followed a state acquittal for the underlying murder), cert. 
denied 522 U.S. 873 (1997).  
 111. See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 94, at Part VI (devoting an entire chapter to the 
consequences of jurisdictional overlap). 
 112. See supra notes 41, 44, 63 and accompanying text.  
 113. See supra note 3. 
 114. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137 (“the result [of barring a state prosecution] would be a shocking 
and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and order 
within their confines”); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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nullification—again impermissible outcomes.115 In either scenario, 
sovereign interests are frustrated in a way inconsistent with the division of 
power in our federal system.116  
But what, really, is at stake when “sovereign” interests are frustrated? 
Or in other words, what does sovereignty mean in our constitutional 
scheme? The dictionary defines sovereignty as the “supreme political 
authority of an independent state.”117 Under the American constitutional 
model, the supreme authority of separate sovereigns is not “inherent”—it 
is not vested in our governments by any higher being, although this was 
the premise of power in earlier times.118 Rather, in our compartmentalized 
representative system, sovereign power is vested in and derived from the 
People, and is exercised by public servants acting as agents of whichever 
subset of the People they represent.119 Entertaining the notion that the 
People, by dividing their sovereign power through state and federal 
constitutions, and in their perpetual role in overseeing exercises of that 
power, are acting as citizens in two capacities, the stakes of the 
preemption/nullification dilemma become acutely meaningful.120 All 
legislative choices made within the realm of concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction, and the interests underlying those choices, are at stake in the 
dual sovereign debate, whether those choices are made at the state or 
 115. See supra notes 41, 48, 55, 58, 79 and accompanying text; Amar, supra note 8, at 17 
(acknowledging that were the doctrine abandoned, “[a] state in effect would be able to veto a federal 
prosecution”); Akhil Reed Amar, Reconstructing Double Jeopardy: Some Thoughts on the Rodney 
King Case, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995) (abandonment would allow states to “partially nullify 
federal criminal law”); see generally William H. Pryor, Madison’s Double Security: In Defense of 
Federalism, the Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2002) 
(“The constitutional ideas of John Calhoun and George Wallace cannot provide a theoretical 
framework for a workable federalism for the twenty-first century.”). It is not difficult to imagine John 
Calhoun or George Wallace finding a way to exploit the constitutional weakness that the dual 
sovereign doctrine seeks to avoid. 
 116. See Justice Marshall’s rationale for the doctrine quoted supra note 79. 
 117. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (7th ed. 1999). 
 118. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 88, at 1429-66 (discussing the 
historical evolution of the understanding of sovereignty as it relates to our federal system of 
government). 
 119. Id. at 1437, 1449-50 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), “The federal and 
State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different 
powers, and designed for different purposes . . . . [T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative 
may be found, resides in the people alone. . . .”). 
 120. Amar argues that the federal Constitution derives its power from the sovereignty of “one 
united People” rather than “thirteen distinct Peoples.” Id. at 1450. That debate is beyond the scope of 
this Note. This Note’s premise is far simpler: the People, by participating in the political processes at 
both the state and national level, are acting as citizens in two capacities. Our system of dual citizenship 
would seem explicitly reaffirmed in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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national level.121 The dual sovereign doctrine preserves the People’s 
power of self-governance, whether exercised through state or national 
citizenship, to the full extent delegated to state and national governments 
in their respective constitutions, thus protecting the People’s supreme 
political authority in this area of jurisdictional overlap.122 
Some argue that, as a practical matter, local and national interests are 
sufficiently aligned in areas of criminal law, and thus there is little reason 
to fear that abandonment of the dual sovereign doctrine would frustrate the 
sovereign power of either electorate.123 History refutes this argument, 
though, as the paradigmatic dual sovereign case is a federal civil rights 
prosecution following a state acquittal or slap on the wrist (e.g. Rodney 
King or Lemuel Penn).124 However, the doctrine’s justification transcends 
the need to safeguard federal civil rights prosecutions.125 As Lanza noted, 
sovereign interests would be frustrated if state and federal laws were to 
carry disparate penalties, and yet adjudication of one government’s law 
would bar enforcement of the other’s law.126 Implicit, perhaps, in Lanza’s 
“race to the courthouse” rationale is recognition of disagreement between 
states and the national government as to whether, or to what extent, certain 
activity should be criminalized (and/or prosecuted).127 Whenever 
community norms, as manifested by sectarian will, are at variance with 
national majoritarian will in a particular subject matter, and that subject 
matter finds its way into the criminal laws at both levels of government, 
the supreme political authority of a subset of the People is pitted against 
the supreme political authority of all of the People.128 Examples of such 
subject matters (past, present, and perhaps future) include: slavery,129 
fugitive slave laws,130 prohibition,131 civil rights,132 pornography,133 sex 
 121. “Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is 
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.” Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.  
 122. See supra notes 46, 79 and accompanying text.  
 123. See supra notes 44, 62, 85 and accompanying text. 
 124. See infra note 132; see also Hoffman, supra note 96, at 661 (recognizing that “Federal civil 
rights prosecutions play an essential role in the fulfillment of the federal government’s responsibility 
to guarantee the constitutional rights of all citizens. This role could be frustrated if these prosecutions 
were barred where prior state court proceedings resulted in acquittals or insufficient sentences”). 
 125. See supra note 7. 
 126. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 127. See supra notes 55, 79. 
 128. In the extreme instance, a local law will explicitly permit that which is prohibited nationally. 
See generally Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541 
(2002) (assessing the desirability of these independent community norms, and the recent controversies 
regarding same-sex marriages, medical marijuana, and the terminally ill’s right to die).  
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (resolving the most famous inter-sovereign dispute).  
 130. Another Exercise found it noteworthy that:  
Moore v. Illinois, which provided the clearest formulation of the doctrine, concerned the 
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crimes,134 prostitution,135 abortion,136 environmental protection,137 drug 
enforcement,138 physician assisted suicide,139 gun control,140 white-collar 
crime,141 anti-trust,142 the death penalty,143 and cloning.144 Without the dual 
sovereign doctrine, courts might find themselves in the middle of any 
number of potentially volatile political debates.145 
validity of state fugitive slave legislation, one of the most politically explosive issues of the 
era. Given this setting, it is understandable that the Court relied on an approach which 
emphasized that the federal and state governments were distinct and independent entities and 
gave only slight consideration to the interests of the defendant. 
Note, supra note 8, at 1542 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. at 20).  
 131. Addressed by U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, XXI; see Murchison, supra note 8 (discussing the 
legacy of the Eighteenth Amendment in the dual sovereign debate). 
 132. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (federal prosecution of the 
officers involved in the Rodney King beating); Myers v. United States, 377 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(affirming the federal civil rights convictions of the killers of Lemuel Penn, an African-American 
United States Army Reserve officer shot in Georgia in 1964; the defendants had previously been 
acquitted of murder in state court).  
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Boone, No. 98-50217, 1999 9th Cir. WESTLAW 417886 (9th Cir. 
June 21, 1999) (affirming a federal conviction for production of child pornography that followed state 
indictment for similar conduct; noting that the defendant’s “allegations of collusion even if true, would 
not support a claim under the Bartkus exception”). 
 134. See, e.g., People v. Esch, 786 P.2d 462 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming state conviction for 
sexual exploitation of a child that followed federal conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor 
involving use of the mails). 
 135. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 2421-24 (2000) (federal criminal provisions relating to prostitution).  
 136. See United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing a joint state/federal 
prosecution of an anti-abortion protester under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Products, Inc., 926 F.2d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 
1991) (holding that “the Jefferson County Air Pollution Board and the United States, through the 
Environmental Protection Agency, may each pursue claims against Louisville Edible for the same 
conduct without subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy”). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Deitz, 991 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming a federal drug 
conviction of a defendant, that came after state prosecutors dismissed, with prejudice, state charges 
alleging the same drug trafficking conduct).  
 139. See Klein, supra note 3, at 1586-88 (discussing Attorney General Ashcroft’s hostility 
towards Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act, and the role of federal criminal law in the dispute). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Collamore, 751 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Me. 1990) (denying motion to 
dismiss federal conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act for possession of a firearm by a 
felon, which followed state conviction based on the same incident). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, (10th Cir. 1998) (federal conviction of 
an insurance agent for mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering not barred by prior state 
acquittal).  
 142. See KURLAND, supra note 9, at 18-20 (discussing the Department of Justice’s policy for 
pursuing Sherman Act cases that follow state conviction or acquittal). 
 143. The availability of the death penalty can be the deciding factor in resolving jurisdictional 
disputes. See supra note 2. The death penalty may have been the impetus for the Alabama prosecution 
in Heath. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 144. See John Charles Kunich, The Naked Clone, 91 KY. L.J. 1 (2002-2003) (discussing various 
government reactions to cloning, which include criminal prohibitions of experimentation).  
 145. Klein, supra note 12, at Part III (noting the overlap between independent norm and 
substantive due process controversies).  
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Furthermore, criminalization of certain conduct, and the vigor with 
which it is prosecuted, varies depending on the sovereign interest 
compelling its criminalization.146 For example, while the federal 
government may intend to safeguard the federal treasury by making it a 
crime to rob any federally-insured bank, states criminalize bank robbery 
for a broader deterrent effect.147 The dual sovereign doctrine saves courts 
from having to determine whether state and federal interests sufficiently 
overlap in a particular area so as to warrant a double jeopardy bar.148  
Because of the politically variegated sovereign interests at play within 
the realm of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, and because a choice 
between either contravening powers undeniably reserved to the states or 
contravening the Supremacy Clause is not a choice reconcilable with the 
vertical division of powers in our federal system, the Court has refused to 
trump one government’s prosecution for the sole reason that it comes after 
another government’s.149 In essence, a judicially-mandated 
intergovernmental double jeopardy bar is not possible in our federal 
system, and the dual sovereign doctrine is an incident of that 
impossibility.150 Critics dissatisfied with the unelaborated invocation of 
sovereignty in dual sovereign precedent151 may feel more comfortable with 
the Court’s rationale if phrased, as this Note attempts, as preservation of 
the co-supremacy of the People’s political authority in the overlap of state 
and national law enforcement. 
Yet whatever benefit one derives from the above analysis, the doctrine 
is still difficult to accept when viewed from the perspective of the criminal 
defendant.152 The Court has rationalized the potential harshness of the rule 
as the price of dual citizenship.153 Nevertheless, the Court has noted that a 
defendant’s right to repose should not be without protection, but that such 
protection must be dictated by non-judicial means.154 Consistent with the 
doctrine’s protection of political choice, the Court has repeatedly stated 
that Congress and state legislatures must address whether, and to what 
extent, they wish their respective governments to be bound by prior 
 146. See Justice Marshall’s dual sovereign rationale, quoted supra note 7. 
 147. Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).  
 148. Heath, 474 U.S. at 92.  
 149. See supra note 79. 
 150. See supra note 55. 
 151. See supra note 84.  
 152. See supra text accompanying note 10.  
 153. See supra notes 37, 40, 43, 79 and accompanying text.  
 154. See supra notes 47, 57 and accompanying text. 
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prosecutions.155 Furthermore, the Court has suggested that common sense 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will limit application of the doctrine to 
rare circumstances.156 These and other important protections, which 
mitigate the harshness of the doctrine, will be discussed below.157 
B. Justifying the Doctrine’s Survival of Incorporation 
The dual sovereign doctrine has survived incorporation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause because incorporation does not resolve the 
preemption/nullification dilemma facing the Judiciary if it is forced to 
referee, on a case by case basis, prosecutions within the overlap of 
criminal jurisdiction peculiar to our federal system of government.158 The 
doctrine’s institutional justifications, discussed above, are as animate now 
as they were prior to incorporation.159  
Along these lines, it is not difficult to reconcile the continuing vitality 
of the doctrine in the double jeopardy context with its abandonment in the 
context of searches and seizures and self-incrimination.160 It is but little 
encroachment on sovereign power to forbid use of evidence illegally 
seized by federal authorities in state trials and vice versa.161 Likewise, the 
federal government can still enforce its own criminal laws even if unable 
to compel witnesses to incriminate themselves under state law and vice 
versa.162 Sovereign power was not unduly sacrificed with the abandonment 
of the doctrine in those two contexts; in contrast, the ability to even initiate 
prosecution is at stake in the double jeopardy context.163 Consequently, if 
federalism concerns are the continuing lifeblood of the doctrine, then 
incorporation is no catalyst for its abandonment in the double jeopardy 
context.164 
Furthermore, when one government illegally seizes evidence to be used 
in the courts of another, or when one government compels testimony 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra note 40. 
 157. See infra Part IV.F. 
 158. See supra note 79. 
 159. Initial reliance on Barron (see supra text accompanying note 47, 54) may have been merely 
an alternative ground for the dual sovereign rationale. 
 160. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 102 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that Elkins and Murphy “do 
not necessarily undermine the basis of the rule allowing successive state and federal prosecutions”). 
 161. Id. (“It is one thing to bar a sovereign from using certain evidence and quite another to bar it 
from prosecuting altogether.”). 
 162. Id.  
 163. See Another Exercise, supra note 8, at 1547-49 (discussing distinctions between Elkins, 
Murphy, and the successive prosecution debate). 
 164. See supra Part IV.A. 
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incriminating a witness under the laws of another (offering the witness up 
on a “silver platter”), suspicion of collusion is strong.165 In these contexts, 
it may be correct to presume that the two governments are conspiring to do 
in tandem what neither could do alone, thus tipping the analysis in favor of 
protection of the criminal defendant.166 However, this presumption of 
collusion and privity cannot be extended to the double jeopardy context 
because a government has a facially-legitimate interest in enforcing its 
own laws, irrespective of the actions of another government.167  
C. Intergovernmental Cooperation and the “Sham Exception” 
While a presumption of collusion is improper, Bartkus suggested in 
dictum that a successive prosecution might be barred in cases where the 
prosecuting state government “was merely a tool” of the federal 
government where the state prosecution was a “sham and a cover” for a 
second federal prosecution or vice versa.168 However, distinguishing 
cooperation from collusion is difficult.169 Although many courts have 
entertained a notion that the “sham exception” might exist, courts have not 
invoked it, setting an insurmountable bar for defendants to overcome.170  
Practical considerations might support the conclusion that if the 
exception exists at all, its evidentiary burden must be nearly prohibitive. 
Intergovernmental cooperation is to be encouraged in law enforcement.171 
 165. See Another Exercise, supra note 8, at 1548 (“[I]n both Elkins and Murphy the prosecuting 
jurisdiction was attempting to use the efforts of the other jurisdiction for its own purposes, whereas in 
the case of successive prosecutions the two governments, in accordance with the basic assumption of 
the dual sovereignties doctrine, may be acting independently of each other.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Double Jeopardy Law after Akhil Amar: Some Civil Procedure Analogies and Inquiries, 26 CUMB. L. 
REV. 23, 29-30 (1995) (When “Government One generates evidence it is constitutionally barred from 
using and makes that evidence available to Government Two, which does not labor under such a 
constitutional disability,” they are acting in privity, whereas this is not necessarily the case in the 
successive prosecution context.). 
 166. See supra notes 69, 70.  
 167. Angleton, 314 F.3d at 773 (“The dual sovereignty doctrine . . . exists independently of any 
interaction between sovereigns; either may prosecute independently to vindicate its own interests.”). 
 168. See supra notes 59, 60 and accompanying text. 
 169. See United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is extremely 
difficult and highly unusual to prove that a prosecution by one government is a tool, a sham or a cover 
for the other government.”). 
 170. See Angleton, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (collecting unsuccessful “sham exception” challenges). 
But see United States v. G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (remanding for further 
fact-finding to determine if the Bartkus exception should apply); United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 
181 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding for further fact-finding); United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 
(W.D. Va. 1991) (dismissing federal indictment as a “sham or cover” for a failed state prosecution, 
where the state and federal prosecutors were the same person).  
 171. See supra note 60. 
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Systemic deterrence or chilling of such cooperation would have grave 
public-safety ramifications.172 Active judicial scrutiny of 
intergovernmental cooperation in a “sham prosecution” inquiry would no 
doubt make law enforcement officials wary of their communications with 
other jurisdictions.173 The ease with which information, leads, resources, 
and evidence are shared would necessarily suffer.174  
Furthermore, were the “sham prosecution” exception broadened and its 
viability as a defense increased, courts would find themselves regularly 
litigating details of law enforcement investigations before proceeding to 
the merits of the charges.175 Because double jeopardy claims must be 
resolved before trial,176 defendants are typically entitled to interlocutory 
appeals if their claims are non-frivolous.177 Increased legal uncertainty in 
this area would result in an explosion of dilatory appeals,178 and cast doubt 
on numerous standing convictions.179 The above concerns may justify the 
defendant’s burden to overcome a strong presumption that the prosecuting 
government is not a “merely a tool” of another government seeking to 
bypass the double jeopardy bar.180  
D. Impracticality of Judicial Reform of the Doctrine  
Any alteration of the dual sovereign doctrine would come at the 
expense of settled law and would necessarily create a host of problems, 
 172. See supra note 1. 
 173. See United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989) (refusing to entertain a 
sham exception noting that “cooperation between state and federal authorities is a welcome 
innovation” (citation omitted)). 
 174. Barriers to information flow conflict with the goals of resource sharing and coordination 
among law enforcement agencies. See supra notes 1, 81.  
 175. The facts of the intergovernmental cooperation in Angleton’s case came from testimony of 
federal agents during pre-trial hearings. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 699 n.2. 
 176. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) (holding that pre-trial denials of double 
jeopardy claims must be subject to immediate appeal, reasoning that double jeopardy’s protection 
against the strain and expense of more than one criminal trial would be “significantly undermined if 
appellate review . . . were postponed until after conviction and sentence”).  
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 539 (2d Cir. 1989) (collecting circuit court 
decisions adopting the standard whereby only non-frivolous double jeopardy claims will stay 
proceedings pending interlocutory appeal).  
 178. Abney, 431 U.S. at 662 n.8 (recognizing that the availability of an interlocutory appeal “may 
encourage some defendants to engage in dilatory” tactics). 
 179. Arguably, a change in the scope of double jeopardy protection in the dual sovereign context 
might open the door for retroactive invalidation of some dual sovereign convictions via federal habeas 
corpus proceedings. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (suggesting the possibility of 
retroactive vindication of “bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a 
particular conviction” (citation omitted)).  
 180. See supra note 170. 
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making judicial reform difficult.181 The Supreme Court’s temporary, 
messy, and short-lived experimentation in other areas of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence justify judicial conservatism in this area.182  
An unvindicated-interest test would prove unmanageable183 and 
implicates separation-of-powers concerns.184 If Congress legislates within 
its enumerated grants, it is traditionally the role of the Executive, not the 
Judiciary, to determine whether the federal interest at stake warrants 
enforcement of the statute.185  
Requiring, as some critics would, state and federal officials to 
coordinate and consolidate their prosecutions in a single proceeding would 
likewise invite impermissible judicial supervision of the executive branch 
at both the state and national levels and would also create numerous 
complex procedural questions.186 
Invoking any amorphous due process limitation, such as vindictive 
prosecution, which bars some successive prosecutions without entirely 
abandoning the doctrine, would be an end run around the Court’s case law 
interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause, which should alone be controlling 
of issues of successive prosecutions.187 Likewise, collateral estoppel is 
foreclosed.188 If a government can reprosecute without violating double 
 181. See supra notes 9, 56, 77.  
 182. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (supplanting the Blockburger “same elements” 
test, used to determine whether two charged offenses implicate double jeopardy concerns, with a 
“same conduct” test), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 709-12 (1993) (recognizing 
the “same conduct” test to be unworkable, and returning to the “same elements” test); see also United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that civil sanctions with “punitive” effect can implicate 
double jeopardy concerns), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98 (1997) (concerned 
with “the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper”). 
 183. See supra note 77.  
 184. See Justice Frankfurter’s admonition, quoted supra note 55. 
 185. The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence is dispositive on the issue of whether Congress 
can legislate to protect federal interests. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). It would be 
anomalous to superimpose a second test to determine whether there exist specific federal interests 
warranting enforcement of that legislation. Angleton, 314 F.3d at 775-76.  
 186. Amar, supra note 8, at 48 (“[A] hybrid system would require a major overhaul of traditional 
divisions between state and federal systems—and would raise knotty threshold questions of when 
different sovereigns’ different laws were nevertheless close enough to require a single hybrid trial.”).  
 187. See United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he fact that the prosecutions of the 
defendants are by two different sovereigns, each acting independently under its own laws and in its 
own interest without any control of or by the other, renders inapplicable the concept of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness.”), quoted in ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 94, at 723. 
 It is difficult to conceive, theoretically, how Government Two’s successive prosecution can be a 
vindictive prosecution made on behalf of Government One, yet not fall within the Bartkus exception 
(if such an exception exists).  
 188. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (holding that the principle of collateral estoppel is 
embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause).  
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jeopardy, it would be anomalous to deny the lesser power of relitigating the 
particular issues necessary to prove the offense.189 
While judicial reform may be foreclosed, Part F discusses other 
avenues to mitigate the potential harshness of a system that allows 
successive prosecutions by separate governments. 
E. Angleton’s Derivative Enforcement, and Sham Prosecution Arguments  
Angleton’s argument that incorporation of Texas law as an element of the 
federal murder-for-hire statute amounts to an attempt by Congress to 
derivatively enforce the Texas law, thus dictating the conclusion that there is 
no independent federal interest justifying a successive federal prosecution, is 
flawed for several reasons.190 While Congress is free to use incorporating 
language in drafting criminal statutes,191 it is unlikely that in so doing it 
intends to effect derivative enforcement of state laws, nor is it likely that in 
so doing it intends to empower state courts to adjudicate the federal crime.192 
Such a drastic consequence should not hinge on the particular language 
Congress uses in drafting its criminal statutes when Congress can just as 
easily adopt by reference the provisions of some model code, or copy without 
reference the exact provisions of a state’s code, as it can use the general 
incorporating language of the murder-for-hire statute.193  
 189. United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1997), quoted in Angleton, 314 F.3d 
at 776. Furthermore, because collateral estoppel requires that the prosecuting entity be the same party 
in both proceedings, it is inapplicable in the dual sovereign context. See supra note 109. 
 190. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. See supra note 105. 
 191. Angleton, 314 F.3d at 775.  
 192. As interpreted by Bartkus, Houston finds a bar when “the second trial is for a violation of the 
very statute whose violation by the same conduct has already been tried in the courts of another 
government empowered to try that question.” 359 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added); see supra note 37. 
Existing federal legislation binding the federal government to state adjudication of a federal crime 
does so explicitly:  
A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar 
to any prosecution under this section for the same act or acts. Nothing contained in this 
section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in 
which provisions of this section operate to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject 
matter, nor shall any provision of this section be construed as invalidating any provision of 
State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this section or any 
provision thereof. 
18 U.S.C. § 659 (2000).  
 193. See United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1099 (3d Cir. 1977) (refusing to find an 
exception to the dual sovereign doctrine that would bar a federal RICO prosecution even though “the 
defendants [had] previously been indicted, tried, and acquitted of the precise state crime assimilated 
into the federal crime by definition”). 
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Angleton’s sham prosecution claim is foreclosed by factual precedent 
where courts have refused, in spite of extensive intergovernmental 
interaction, to find one government to be acting as a tool of the other.194 
F. Safeguards of the Status Quo 
As mentioned at the outset, analysis of the dual sovereign debate 
involves reconciling a longstanding civil liberty with the division of power 
in our federal system in a context where the two are in tension.195 Having 
discussed how the doctrine seeks to avoid frustration of the vertical 
division of powers of our constitutional scheme (the 
nullification/preemption dilemma),196 it is necessary to accurately assess 
the countervailing concern for the rights of criminal defendants. Relevant 
in this assessment are factors that mitigate the harshness of the doctrine—
factors that safeguard criminal defendants, as a practical matter, from 
successive prosecutions and duplicative punishment. 
In response to the Bartkus decision, the Justice Department instituted 
the Petite Policy to deal with the issue of successive prosecutions.197 While 
the policy does not create any judicially-enforceable rights,198 it does place 
meaningful limits on the federal government’s prosecutorial discretion, 
thereby assuaging fears of arbitrary successive prosecutions.199 
Furthermore, the executive branch’s political accountability may serve as 
an additional check on arbitrary abuse of the power preserved by the dual 
sovereign doctrine.200  
 194. Angleton, 221 F. Supp.2d at 713-22 (giving extensive discussion of the facts in federal cases 
where defendants have alleged a sham).  
 195. Justice Marshall framed the debate in this way in his Heath dissent, quoted supra note 79.  
 196. See supra Part IV.A. 
 197. See supra Part III.D. 
 198. See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 583 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Petite 
Policy does not confer rights to defendants), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979). 
 199. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent 
Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72 (1996), for discussion on how the 
Petite Policy serves as an effective check on successive prosecutions, thus alleviating some 
federalization concerns: 
Statistics on dual prosecutions reflect the selectivity that the Petite Policy has produced. Dual 
prosecutions are quite rare. The Justice Department’s 94 U.S. Attorney’s Offices and 
litigating divisions together typically bring fewer than 150 dual prosecutions each year. This 
represents a tiny fraction of the total number of state prosecutions that, because of 
overlapping federal and state jurisdiction, could be reprosecuted in the federal system, and a 
small fraction of the approximately 65,000 annual federal prosecutions. 
Id. at 77 (citation omitted).  
 
 200. See KURLAND, supra note 9, at 26 n.50 (speculating as to the political effect of the Rodney 
King reprosecution: “As a political decision in the electoral sense of the term, the decision to prosecute 
the officers in the King case did not help President George Bush, who was defeated for reelection in 
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Responding to the Court’s explicit decision to leave the issue of 
successive prosecutions to legislative branches,201 a majority of states have 
enacted statutes that either prohibit or limit their ability to prosecute a 
defendant already charged by another government for the same criminal 
act.202 Again, these limitations are imposed by the legislative, rather than 
the judicial branch.203 
A 1975 proposal for federal legislation dealing with successive 
prosecutions in the federal system failed because it was thought that the 
Petite Policy adequately dealt with the problem.204 In 1994, an ABA task 
force studied the status of dual sovereign prosecutions.205 Ultimately, the 
task force recommended that the Justice Department should annually 
publicize data on Petite prosecutions, but refused to pursue federal 
legislation that would strip the department of the power to bring 
successive prosecutions.206 
Additionally, federal sentencing guidelines may protect a defendant 
from duplicative punishment even if convicted at both the state and federal 
level.207 It is a general policy of the federal sentencing guidelines that 
1992 and lost California by a significant margin”). 
 201. See supra notes 47, 57 and accompanying text. 
 202. See KURLAND, supra note 9, at Part II (giving a complete survey of the state approaches). 
 The Model Penal Code approach would substantially limit the power to bring successive 
prosecutions:  
§ 1.10. Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction: When a Bar. 
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the 
United States or another State, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances: 
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in Section 1.08 
and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless 
(a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for 
which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other 
and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different 
harm or evil or 
(b) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or 
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment 
found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set 
aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of the offense 
for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (2002). 
 203. Such reforms do not upset the vertical and horizontal divisions of our institutions. See supra 
note 55. 
 204. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 94, at 772. 
 205. ABA, Criminal Justice Section, Final Report of Ad Hoc Task Force on Double Jeopardy 
(1994), reprinted in KURLAND, supra note 9, app. C, at 369.  
 206. See KURLAND, supra note 9, at 372 (concluding that the Petite Policy is generally sound). 
 207. Id. at ch. 2 (discussing how the federal sentencing guidelines might deal with dual sovereign 
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sentences for redundant counts or counts overlapping with prior 
undischarged sentences should run concurrently rather than 
consecutively.208 In other words, sentencing guidelines can safeguard 
defendants from being twice punished for the same offense.209 Under the 
current guidelines, judges are allowed, though not required, to have federal 
counts run concurrently with prior state sentences arising out of the same 
criminal conduct.210 Although the guidelines do not specifically address 
the issue of federal sentences imposed after state acquittals, the Supreme 
Court has held that federal judges may consider prior acquittals for 
purposes of downward departures in federal sentencing.211 The sentencing 
guidelines could be amended to further strengthen this safeguard.  
In his Bartkus dissent, Justice Black noted that the doctrine had 
previously only been applied in rare instances explainable by anomalous 
circumstances.212 Justice Black attributed this rarity to the inherent 
injustice of the doctrine.213 However, in an age of burgeoning federal 
criminal law, that the doctrine is rarely applied,214 and only in compelling 
circumstances, suggests that the “benignant spirit” of our federal system 
serves as a tangible check, just as the Court originally forecasted.215 
In sum, the potential for abuse of the dual sovereign doctrine is 
checked by: (1) the Petite Policy; (2) the political accountability of the 
executive branch; (3) state legislation; (4) federal sentencing guidelines 
that can prevent duplicative punishment or mitigate the unfairness of a 
successive prosecution; and (5) continuing vigilance of state and national 
electorates who can consent at any time through legislation, generally or 
convictions). 
 208. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.3 (Nov. 2001). 
 209. See generally Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: the Problem of Multiple 
Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245 (2002) (analyzing how the federal guidelines deal with multiple 
punishment in the federal system). 
 210. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.3, cmt. n.3 (in achieving “reasonable” 
punishment, courts should be cognizant of the fact that a “prior undischarged sentence may have been 
imposed in state court rather than federal court”).  
 211. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 112 (1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in considering, for purposes of downward departure, prior state acquittal; nonetheless 
noting that “consideration of this factor could be incongruous with the dual responsibilities of 
citizenship in our federal system in some instances”).  
 212. 359 U.S. 121, 162.  
 213. Id.  
 214. See supra note 199. 
 215. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
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particularly tailored, to the adjudications of other jurisdictions. 
Safeguarding the criminal defendants’ right to repose through any of the 
above means does not implicate the dual sovereign doctrine’s federalism 
concerns as phrased earlier in this Note.216  
G. Delicate Balance Achieved or the Lesser of Two Evils? 
The obvious rebuttal to the argument that our current criminal justice 
system adequately safeguards defendants from successive prosecution, 
thus mitigating the harshness of the dual sovereign doctrine, is that 
successive prosecutions do occur.217 Whatever safeguards exist, they did 
not help Angleton, and the extreme facts of his case strain the doctrine’s 
federalism rationale to the limit.218 However, systemic justifications for a 
rule, in the context of a difficult case of its application, are never as 
satisfying as they might otherwise be.219 The Court’s choice to recognize 
and strictly adhere to the dual sovereign doctrine in the double jeopardy 
context was a difficult one, traversing the multifarious intersection of 
state, federal, and individual sovereignty. Whether the Court’s choice can 
be deemed an achievement of a delicate balance or an acceptance of the 
lesser of two evils, it is a choice not as unsubstantiated as most critics have 
suggested.220  
 216. See supra Part IV.A. 
 217. See supra note 199. 
 218. In cases such as Angleton’s, the federal interest is articulated as follows: 
While contract killing, standing alone, may not be a federal crime, it may become such when 
its perpetration involves the use of the mail or facilities in interstate commerce. The 
independence and importance of the federal interest in protecting the channels of interstate 
commerce from the taint of crime is unaffected by . . . previous acquittal[s] in state court; it 
remains just as important and worthy of vindication after the state trial as it was before. 
“[T]he federal government had an interest, independent of any state interest, to ensure that an 
individual who is believed to have violated a federal statute is prosecuted for that violation.” 
United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1997).  
 219. “The Court’s express rationale for the dual sovereignty doctrine is not simply a fiction that 
can be disregarded in difficult cases.” Heath, 474 U.S. at 92. 
 For the record, this Note disagrees with Heath’s extension of the dual sovereign doctrine to 
successive state prosecutions. The original rationale for the doctrine, as this Note phrases it, and as 
Justice Marshall did in his Heath dissent, is accommodation of state/national power in the unavoidable 
jurisdictional overlap, not acquiescence to inherent notions of sovereignty. See supra note 79 and Part 
IV.A. Concurrent criminal jurisdiction betweens states is neither necessary under our federal scheme, 
nor is it desirable. Heath, 474 U.S. at 100-01. 
 220. See supra note 8.  
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V. PROPOSAL: ACCEPTING THE DUAL SOVEREIGN DOCTRINE  
A. Accepting the Dual Sovereign Doctrine  
Behind the dual sovereign debate is a conflict between two ancient 
legal principles: sovereignty and double jeopardy. Stripping sovereignty of 
its sacred inherency221 and double jeopardy of its natural law gloss,222 this 
Note has sought to explore the legitimacy of the Court’s invocation of 
federalism in refusing to find a constitutional bar to successive 
prosecutions. As stated at the outset, any satisfactory resolution of the dual 
sovereign debate must reconcile the protection of a basic civil liberty and 
the due respect for the sovereign powers of separate governments in our 
federal system.223 By phrasing the Court’s protection of sovereign power 
as recognition of the co-supremacy of the People’s political authority 
within the jurisdictional overlap of state-and-national law enforcement, 
this Note has attempted to substantiate the Court’s federalism rationale.224 
In assessing the countervailing concern for the plight of criminal 
defendants within the jurisdictional overlap, this Note has explored ways 
in which our current system mitigates the potential harshness of the 
doctrine and safeguards against arbitrary abuse of the power to bring 
successive prosecutions.225 Balancing the above considerations and finding 
justification for the continuing vitality of the doctrine, this Note suggests 
cautious acceptance of the status quo. 
B. Supreme Political Authority and Dual Citizenship  
In explicit effect, the dual sovereign doctrine provides that one 
government must consent to be bound to the adjudicative finality of 
another government’s proceedings in an area where the two have 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction and that such consent should not be 
interpreted from the Double Jeopardy Clause as incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.226 Many states have thus consented through acts 
of their legislatures.227 That the Federal government has not likewise 
 221. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 71 and text accompanying note 64. 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 12.  
 224. See supra Part IV.A.  
 225. See supra Part IV.F.  
 226. See supra Part II.B.  
 227. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.  
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consented may not be surprising given the general interest at stake in 
national legislation228 and the desire for uniform enforcement.229  
The dual sovereign doctrine serves as a meaningful reminder that we 
live in a federal system of government.230 In this regard, the doctrine may 
effectuate a cleaner division of exercised power within our federal system 
through political processes in that citizens, wary of the potential of 
successive prosecutions, might withdraw certain crimes from the federal 
political arena, thus limiting the scope of concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction.231 Likewise, waves of public opinion, like those seen after 
Rodney King, might alter standards of prosecutorial discretion or compel 
Congress or the President to bar successive prosecutions at the federal 
level.232 Then again, citizens wishing to ensure adequate protection from 
certain types of crime and also wishing to ensure potent intergovernmental 
cooperation might acquiesce to criminalization at both levels of 
government. Either scenario illustrates the incident of dual citizenship 
whereby duplicative protections and “commensurate obligations” can be 
created or limited.233  
C. Non-judicial Reform and Vigilance in the Age of Cooperative 
Federalism  
Judicial hostility toward Congress’s expansion of federal criminal law 
under the Commerce Clause should not spill into the dual sovereign 
 228. See supra note 205.  
 229. Is it reasonable to expect that Texas and Connecticut would equally vindicate national gun 
control policy if the national government were relegated to vicarious reliance on state prosecutions and 
penalties? Just as the national government cannot force its regulatory regime on the states, Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal law imposing an interim obligation on state 
law enforcement officials to perform background checks on hand-gun purchasers), the national 
government should not be forced to accept the product of the varying state policies.  
 230. Similarly, we are reminded of our dual sovereignty when our state constitutional provisions 
confer more rights than identical federal provisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 
487 (Ky. 1992) (holding that a criminal statute proscribing consensual homosexual sodomy violates 
rights guaranteed under Kentucky’s constitution, even though such rights were not protected by similar 
provisions of the federal Constitution; noting that “under our system of dual sovereignty, it is our 
responsibility to interpret and apply our state constitution independently”).  
 231. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 247, 310 (1997) (arguing that the proper balance of state and national power in the area of law 
enforcement should be dictated by the “interests of electoral majorities, [and] are better left to the trial 
and error of the political process”).  
 232. See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also Timothy Lynch, Dereliction Of Duty: 
The Constitutional Record Of President Clinton, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 783, 808-11 (1999) (criticizing 
President Clinton for failing to issue an executive order curtailing successive federal prosecutions 
during his terms).  
 233. See Justice Marshall’s dual sovereign rationale, quoted supra note 79. 
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debate.234 The dual sovereign doctrine preserves state power as much as 
federal power—the larger the jurisdictional overlap, the greater the 
stakes.235 It would invite inappropriate and untenable judicial inquiry to 
decide case-by-case whether a sovereign’s interests are sufficiently 
unvindicated so as to warrant a second prosecution.236 That a government 
has criminalized behavior within the sphere of its constitutional power 
should be sufficient to demonstrate a justiciable interest in prosecuting 
violations of its own laws.237 Whether or not this interest need be 
vindicated is a determination correctly left to the limited discretion of the 
executive branch of each government, which in turn is responsive to its 
citizens.238 
While judicial reform may be untenable, the issue of dual sovereign 
prosecutions warrants continuing vigilance.239 On the one hand, increases 
in intergovernmental cooperation in law enforcement may safeguard 
against successive prosecutions through coordination of prosecutorial 
interests and efficient use of resources in a single proceeding.240 However, 
increased cooperation also raises the risk of coordinated efforts to get two 
bites at the same apple.241 Consequently, the public should carefully 
scrutinize the use/abuse of the power to bring successive prosecutions and 
check that power as needed.242 Additionally, strengthening the alternative 
protections discussed above would further safeguard against any injustice 
worked by the doctrine.243 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The dual sovereign doctrine exists to avoid a constitutional quagmire. 
Avoidance of the nullification/preemption dilemma comes at the expense 
of the “spirit” of double jeopardy protection. Critics correctly note the 
 234. See supra notes 105, 106, 185 and accompanying text.  
 235. See supra Part IV.A. 
 236. See supra Part IV.D. 
 237. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.  
 238. See supra note 231.  
 239. Justice Marshall, in his Heath dissent, cautiously accepted the Court’s adherence to the dual 
sovereign doctrine in the context of state and federal prosecutions: “Mindful of the admonitions of 
Justice Black, we should recognize this exegesis of the [Double Jeopardy] Clause as, at best, a useful 
fiction and, at worst, a dangerous one.” 474 U.S. at 98; see also KURLAND, supra note 9, at xxvi n.6 
(emphasizing the constant need to scrutinize and reexamine double jeopardy law; noting the likely 
increase in successive prosecutions of criminal aliens in the September 11th aftermath).  
 240. See the purpose of the Petite Policy, supra note 81.  
 241. See Amar, supra note 8, at 33. 
 242. See supra Part V.B. 
 243. See supra Part IV.F. 
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potential for abuse of the power to bring successive prosecutions in our 
age of cooperative federalism. However, the continuing vitality of the 
doctrine’s rationale, the lack of manageable judicial alternatives, and the 
existence of safeguards limiting the doctrine’s application to acceptable 
circumstances while mitigating its harshness counsel against any drastic 
deviation from the status quo.  
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